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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This appeal is within the jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to Utah Code 
Annotated § 78-2a-3(2)(f), since it involves an appeal from a court of record in a criminal case not 
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
The Defendant/Appellant, who entered guilty pleas to FORGERY, a third-degree felony, and 
ATTEMPTED UNLAWFUL USE OF A CREDIT CARD, a class A misdemeanor, and who did not 
timely move to withdraw his guilty plea, initially sought in this appeal to have his case remanded 
to determine the validity of his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, but the Appellant opposed 
the motion to remand, and this Court denied the motion and dismissed the appeal with respect to 
claims for ineffective assistance of counsel and any challenge to the validity of his guilty plea. See 
Addendum Exhibit A (This Court's March 25,2004 Memorandum Decision issued in this case; State 
v. Bang, 2004 UT App 79). 
The only remaining issue asserted by the Defendant/Appellant is as follows: 
Whether the District Court committed plain error in ordering that the Defendant pay 
restitution in the amount of $2,300. See Record at p. 65-68 (Judgment, Commitment and Sentence), 
Addendum Exhibit B. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Terms of sentences in criminal cases are reviewed for abuse of discretion. State v. Houk, 
906 P.2d 907, 909 (Utah App. 1995). The standard for determining whether plain error occurred is 
as follows: to determine that plain error occurred, the appellate court must find that (i) an error 
occurred; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., 
1 
absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant. See, 
e.g., State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). 
PRESERVATION OF THE ISSUE 
The issue was not preserved by the Defendant or his counsel at sentencing, thus in order to 
reverse and/or remand, this Court would have to find that plain error occurred, as discussed above. 
See id. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-203 provides the criteria for determining restitution. See 
Addendum Exhibit C. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant/Appellant entered guilty pleas to FORGERY, a third-degree felony, and 
ATTEMPTED UNLAWFUL USE OF A CREDIT CARD, a class A misdemeanor. See Record at 
p. 50-56. His conviction was entered and he was sentenced. See Record at p. 65-68 (Judgment, 
Commitment and Sentence), Addendum Exhibit B. 
The Defendant/Appellant then filed this appeal. See Record at p. 69-70 (Notice of Appeal). 
He initially sought in this appeal to have his case remanded to determine the validity of his claims 
of ineffective assistance of counsel, but the Appellant opposed the motion to remand, and this Court 
denied the motion and dismissed the appeal with respect to claims for ineffective assistance of 
counsel and any challenge to the validity of his guilty plea. See Addendum Exhibit A (Memorandum 
Decision). 
This Court, however, did not dismiss the portion of Defendant/Appellant's appeal 
challenging the restitution ordered in his sentence. See id. 
2 
In the sentencing phase of the proceedings below, a Pre-Sentence Investigation Report 
("PSI") was prepared and considered by the District Court at the sentencing hearing. See Record at 
p. 61 (PSI) (not included in Addendum because it was sealed); see also Record at p. 73 (hearing 
transcript pages 16-24). 
The PSI recommended the District Court order the Defendant to pay $2,300 restitution, and 
the District Court did so, without objection from the Defendant or his counsel at the sentencing 
hearing. See id. 
The PSI asserts that the $2,300 restitution amount reflected merchandise the Defendant 
illegally obtained from the merchant victim in the case. See Record at p. 61 (PSI pages 5-6). 
However, the PSI concedes that the merchandise was confiscated from the Defendant by the police. 
See id. (PSI page 3). The PSI does indicates that although the merchandise was confiscated by the 
police, the victim had not yet received it back from the police and that the condition of the 
merchandise was unknown. See id. (PSI pages 5-6). 
Despite the fact the merchandise was confiscated and held by police to be returned to the 
victim, the Court ordered restitution in the amount of $2,300 for the merchandise. See Record at p. 
65-68 (Judgment, Commitment and Sentence at p. 2), Addendum Exhibit B. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The District Court committed plain error in ordering restitution for the value of the 
merchandise at issue, when that merchandise was not lost, but was rather confiscated from the 
Defendant/Appellant when he was arrested, and simply had not yet been returned to the victim by 
the police, who were holding it in evidence at the time of the sentencing hearing. 
3 
ARGUMENTS 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 provides that the District Court shall, when determine the 
monetary sum for restitution to be included in sentences for criminal offenses, consider the value of 
the victim's property which was lost or destroyed. See Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(4)(b)(i). 
The property in question in this case, as explained in the PSI, was not lost or destroyed, but 
was rather confiscated from the Defendant/Appellant when he was arrested, and simply had not yet 
been returned to the victim by the police, who were holding it in evidence at the time of the 
sentencing hearing. 
It was an abuse of discretion for the District Court to order restitution in the amount of the 
value of that merchandise, since it was not clearly lost or destroyed. 
While neither the Defendant nor his counsel raised this issue at the sentencing hearing, the 
Defendant is entitled to raise this issue here on appeal for the first time, since it constitutes plain 
error. The standard for determining whether plain error occurred is as follows: to determine that 
plain error occurred, the appellate court must find that (i) an error occurred; (ii) the error should have 
been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the appellant. See, e.g., State v. Dunn, 850 
P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993). As set forth above, since the merchandise at issue was not lost or 
destroyed, it is clear that an error occurred in setting the restitution at $2,300. Since the status of the 
merchandise was clearly set forth in the PSI, the error should have been obvious to the trial court. 
This error was harmful, in that it resulted in a restitution order based on the value of merchandise 
which was recovered rather than lost or destroyed. 
4 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant/Appellant respectfully requests that this Court reverse the restitution order 
in the Judgment, Commitment and Sentence, and either order that no restitution is owed by this 
Defendant/Appellant, or remand for consideration of the proper amount of restitution in this case. 
Dated this g G ^ day of M a ^ 20 o ^ , n 
Randall C. Allen 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellant 
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ADDENDUM 
A. Memorandum Decision issued in this case by this Court on March 25, 2004 
B. Judgment, Commitment and Sentence 
C. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-203 
EXHIBIT A 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
MAR 2 5 2004 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
Mario D. King, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
(Not For Official Publication) 
Case No. 20030544-CA 
F I L E D 
( M a r c h 2 5 , 2 0 0 4 ) 
2 0 0 4 UT App 79 
Fifth District, Cedar City Department 
The Honorable J. Philip Eves 
Attorneys: Randall C. Allen, Cedar City, for Appellant 
Mark L. Shurtleff and Jeanne B. Inouye, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Jackson, and Thorne. 
PER CURIAM: 
Mario D. King appeals his conviction and sentence for 
Forgery, a third degree felony, and Attempted Unlawful Use of a 
Credit Card, a class A misdemeanor. This appeal is before the 
court on King's motion for a remand pursuant to rule 23B of the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure and on the State's motion for 
partial dismissal of the appeal. 
King did not file a timely motion to withdraw his guilty 
pleas; nevertheless, he seeks to challenge the validity of the 
pleas on appeal, contending that his trial counsel was 
ineffective in advising him. The claim is, in substance, that 
his pleas were not knowing and voluntary when entered. 
Failure to file a timely motion to withdraw a guilty plea 
"extinguishes a defendant's right to challenge the validity of 
the guilty plea on appeal," State v. Reyes, 2002 UT 13,^3, 40 
P.3d 630, including any right to challenge the guilty plea on the 
basis of ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. Melo, 
2001 UT App 392,H1f7-8, 40 P. 3d 646. Because King failed to file 
a timely motion to withdraw his guilty pleas, this court lacks 
jurisdiction to consider the claim that his guilty plea was not 
voluntary as a result of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. 
King also failed to respond to the State's motion for partial 
dismissal. Finally, the rule 23B motion seeks a remand to enter 
findings of fact only on a claim that counsel was ineffective in 
representing King in connection with his guilty pleas.1 
Accordingly, because we dismiss appeal to the extent that it 
challenges the validity of the guilty pleas, we must also deny 
the rule 23B motion. 
We dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction only insofar 
as it raises issues challenging the validity of the guilty plea. 
The appeal shall continue as to the remaining issues related to 
sentencing. 
idith M. Billings, 
Presiding Judge 
_^A^tA^ 
Norman R. Jackson", 
^ *7 Z..-.Q, 
William A. Thorne Jr., ''Judge 
1. Even if the merits of the motion were considered, it does not 
satisfy rule 23B's requirement to allege a nonspeculative 
allegation of facts and instead makes conclusory allegations that 
King seeks to support on remand. See Utah R. App. P. 23B(a); 
State v. Johnson, 2000 UT App 290,^7, 13 P.3d 175. 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the 25th day of March, 2004, a true and 
correct copy of the attached DECISION was deposited in the United 
States mail or placed in Interdepartmental mailing to be 
delivered to: 
RANDALL C. ALLEN 
JENSEN GRAFF & BARNES LLP 
250 S MAIN ST 
PO BOX 726 
CEDAR CITY UT 84720 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
ATTORNEY GENERAL 
JEANNE B. INOUYE 
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
160 E 300 S 6TH FL 
PO BOX 140854 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0854 
HONORABLE J. PHILIP EVES 
FIFTH DISTRICT, CEDAR CITY 
CEDAR CITY HALL OF JUSTICE 
40 N 100 E 
CEDAR CITY UT 84720 
Judicial Secretary ^^"^ 
TRIAL COURT: FIFTH DISTRICT, CEDAR CITY, 021501005 
APPEALS CASE NO.: 20030544-CA 
EXHIBIT B 
TROY A. LITTLE (#9061) 
Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney 
97 North Main, Suite #1 
P.O. Box 428 
Cedar City, Utah 84720 
Telephone: (435) 586-6694 
Telecopier: (435) 586-2737 
IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
MARIO KING, 
d.o.b. 11/19/63 
ss# 
Defendant. 
JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT and 
SENTENCE 
Criminal No. 021501005 
Judge J. Philip Eves 
The Defendant, MARIO KING, having entered a plea of guilty to the offense(s) of 
Forgery, a Third-Degree Felony, and Attempted Unlawful Use of a Credit Card, a Class A 
Misdemeanor, on June 2, 2003, and the Court having accepted said plea of guilty and the above-
entitled matter having been called on for sentencing on June 2, 2003, in Parowan, Utah, and the 
above-named Defendant, MARIO KING, having appeared before the Court in person together 
with his attorney of record, Dale Sessions, and the State of Utah having appeared by and through 
Chief Deputy Iron County Attorney Troy A Little, and the Court having reviewed the sentencing 
recommendation and having further reviewed the file in detail and thereafter having heard 
statements from the Defendant, his attorney, and the Deputy Iron County Attorney, and the Court 
being fully advised in the premises now makes and enters the following Judgment, Sentence, and 
JUN 
5th DISTRICT COURT 
IRON COUNTY 
. Depuiv Cieri 
Commitment, to wit: 
JUDGMENT 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the Defendant, 
MARIO KING, has been convicted upon his plea of guilty to the offense of Forgery, a Third-
Degree Felony, and Attempted Unlawful Use of a Credit Card, a Class A Misdemeanor, and the 
Court having asked whether the Defendant had anything to say in regard to why judgment should 
not be pronounced, and no sufficient cause to the contrary being shown or appearing to the Court, 
it is adjudged that the Defendant is guilty as charged and convicted. 
SENTENCE 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Defendant, MARIO KING, and pursuant to his 
conviction of Forgery, a Third-Degree Felony, and Attempted Unlawful Use of a Credit Card, a 
Class A Misdemeanor, is hereby sentenced to a term of zero to five (0-5) years in the Utah State 
Prison. The statutory fine is suspended. Restitution in the amount of two thousand three hundred 
dollars ($2,300) shall be paid under the supervision of Utah Department of Adult Probation and 
Parole. 
COMMITMENT 
TO THE SHERIFF OF IRON COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH: 
YOU ARE HEREBY COMMANDED to take the Defendant, MARIO KING, and deliver 
him to the Utah State Prison in Draper, Utah, there to be kept and confined in accordance with 
the above and foregoing Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment. 
DATED this /O ^ d a y of June, 2003. 
BY THE COURT: 
^Philip Eves 
)istrict Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF IRON ) 
I, CAROLYN BULLOCH, Clerk of the Fifth Judicial District Court in and for Iron 
County, State of Utah, hereby certify that the foregoing is a full, true and exact copy of the 
original Judgment, Sentence, and Commitment in the case entitled State of Utah vs. MARIO 
KING, Criminal No. 021501005, now on file and of record in my office. 
WITNESS my hand and the seal of said office in Cedar City, County of Iron, State of 
Utah, this \ 3 day of June, 2003. 
CAROLYN BULLOCH 
CAROLYN BULLOCH 
District Court Clerk 
( S E A L ) 
ljid(iLr\^n^v By:. 
Deputy District Court Clerk 
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UT ST § 77-38a-302 Page 1 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-302 
c 
UTAH CODE, 1953 
TITLE 77. UTAH CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 38a. CRIME VICTIMS RESTITUTION ACT 
PART 3. RESTITUTION REQUIREMENTS 
77-38a-302 Restitution criteria. 
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court 
shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in 
this chapter, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make 
restitution as part of a plea disposition. For purposes of restitution, a victim 
has the meaning as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(13) and in determining whether 
restitution is appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as 
provided in Subsections (2) through (5). 
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and 
court-ordered restitution. 
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim 
for all losses caused by the defendant. 
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having 
criminal jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal 
sentence at the time of sentencing. 
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as 
provided in Subsection (5). 
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under 
this part, the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court 
record. 
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the 
restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full 
hearing on the issue. 
(5) (a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense 
Copr. @ West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
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U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-302 
shall include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing 
court or to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an 
offense that involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of 
criminal activity, includes any person directly harmed by the defendant's 
criminal conduct in the course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete 
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or 
loss or destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and 
devices relating to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical 
care and treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing 
recognized by the law of the place of treatment; 
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and 
rehabilitation; 
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the 
offense resulted in bodily injury to a victim; 
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are 
lost due to theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that 
were owned by the victim and were essential to the victim's current 
employment at the time of the offense; and 
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense 
resulted in the death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered 
restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections (5) (a) 
and (b) and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment 
of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the 
defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment 
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
Copr. © West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
UT ST § 77-38a-302 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-302 
Page 3 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make restitution 
inappropriate. 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an order of 
restitution if the court determines that the complication and prolongation of 
the sentencing process, as a result of considering an order of restitution 
under this Subsection (5), substantially outweighs the need to provide 
restitution to the victim. 
History: C. 1953, 77-38a-302, enacted by L. 2001, ch. 137, § 8; 2002, ch. 35, § 
13; 2002, Ch. 185, § 51; 2003, ch. 285, § 1. 
<General Materials (GM) - References, Annotations, or Tables> 
NOTES, REFERENCES, AND ANNOTATIONS 
Amendment Notes. --The 2 002 amendment by ch. 35, effective May 6, 2 002, in 
Subsection (1) substituted "chapter" for "subsection" and "Subsection 77-38a-
102(13)" for "Subsection 77-38a-102 (12) . " 
The 2002 amendment by ch. 185, effective May 6, 2002, updated a statutory 
reference in Subsection (1) and made a stylistic change. 
This section has been reconciled by the Office of Legislative Research and General 
Counsel. 
The 2003 amendment, effective May 5, 2003, added Subsection (5)(b)(v) and 
designated former Subsection (5)(b)(v) as (5)(b)(vi). 
Effective Dates. --Laws 2001, ch. 137 became effective on April 30, 2001, pursuant 
to Utah Const., Art. VI, Sec. 25. 
U.C.A. 1953 § 77-38a-302, UT ST § 77-38a-302 
Statutes current through 2003 2nd Special Session. Annotations current through 
Copr. ® West 2004 No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works 
Page 5 of 5 
UT ST § 77-38a-302 Page 4 
U C A 1953 § 77 38a 302 
UT 51 (11/14/2003), 2003 Utah APP 389 (11/14/2003 and November 14, 2003 
(Federal Cases) 
Copyright ® 2003 by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc , a member of the 
of the LexisNexis Group All rights reserved 
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